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Abstract
Uptake is typically understood as the hearer’s recognition of the speaker’s commu-
nicative intention. According to one theory of uptake, the hearer’s role is merely as
a ratifier. The speaker, by expressing a particular communicative intention, predeter-
mines what kind of illocutionary act she might perform. Her hearer can then render
this act a success or a failure. Thus the hearer has no power over which act could be
performed, but she does have some power over whether it is performed. Call this the
ratification theory of uptake. Several philosophers have recently endorsed an alterna-
tive theory of uptake, according to which the hearer can determine the nature of the
act the speaker performs. According to this theory, if the hearer regards an utterance
as illocutionary act y, then it is act y, even if the speaker intended to perform act x.
Call this the constitution theory of uptake. The purported advantage of this theory is
that it identifies a common but underanalysed way in which speakers can be silenced.
I argue that despite its initial intuitive pull, the constitution theory of uptake should be
rejected. It is incompatiblewith ordinary intuitions about speech, it entails a conceptual
impossibility (the unintentional exercise of normative powers), and it has unsavoury
political implications, entailing that marginalised speakers barely qualify as agents.
Keywords Speech act theory · Uptake · Normative powers · Autonomy · Feminist
philosophy · Intentionalism
In 1952 two teenagers, Christopher Craig and Derek Bentley, attempted to burgle
a warehouse in London. Christopher brought a revolver with him. Police officers
arrived to find the boys on the roof of the warehouse. One police officer climbed
up and grabbed hold of Derek, while instructing Christopher to hand over his gun.
Derek shouted to his friend, ‘Let him have it, Chris!’. Christopher opened fire. He shot
the police officer holding Derek non-fatally in the shoulder, and then shot the next
police officer who climbed onto the roof in the head, killing him instantly. In the boys’
trial there was disagreement as to whether by shouting, ‘Let him have it’, Derek had
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incited Christopher to murder the police officer or ordered him to surrender his gun.
The former interpretation triumphed. Despite not firing the gun himself, Derek was
charged with murder and in 1953 he was executed by hanging.1
This case raises the question of who determines illocutionary force. Let us assume
that Derek intended to order Christopher to surrender the gun, but Christopher inter-
preted Derek as inciting him to murder the police officer. Whose judgement is
authoritative? I.e., who decides which act was performed? For Derek, this question
was a matter of life or death. More generally, it is as much an issue of ethics as it is of
philosophy of language. It has a bearing not only on debates about intentionalism and
conventionalism, but also on how we conceive of the autonomy and normative powers
of speakers.2
In this paper I consider two ways of theorising the power of a hearer’s ‘uptake’.
According to one theory, the potential illocutionary force of an utterance is determined
by the speaker, who, in accordance with conventions, expresses a communicative
intention to perform a particular illocutionary act. Her illocutionary act is successful
only if her hearer recognises that intention. The hearer has no power over which act
could be performed, but she does have power over whether it is performed. She can
either ratify the attempted act or render it a failure. This entails that Derek attempted
but failed to order Christopher to surrender the gun, because Christopher failed to
recognise his intention. Call this the ratification theory of uptake.
We might think that this theory paints too rosy a picture of human communication,
since it cannot accommodate the fact that sometimes hearers seemingly make it the
case that speakers perform illocutionary acts which are different from the acts they
intended to perform. It seems that Derek did not just fail to perform the act of ordering
Christopher to surrender the gun, but rather performed a different act all together, due
to Christopher’s interpretation. Many people, especially marginalised speakers, seem
to find themselves vulnerable to this phenomenon. For example, women who attempt
to give orders often seem to end up making mere requests instead, due to hearers
interpreting them as such.
A second theory of uptake has recently emergedwhich allows that hearers canmake
an utterance constitute an illocutionary act which is different from the illocutionary
1 In 1993, Derek Bentley won a posthumous pardon, and in 1998 his murder conviction was quashed. See
R v. Derek William Bentley (deceased) [1998] EWCA Crim 2516.
2 I have simplified this case for rhetorical effect. I suggest that Derek could be interpreted as performing
two different illocutionary acts—inciting Christopher to kill and ordering him to surrender the gun. Yet
the difference between the two acts might be better parsed as a difference in locutionary content, rather
than a difference in illocutionary force. Inciting and ordering are both, after all, exercitives. Under both
interpretations Derek is telling Christopher to do something. The debate concerns what exactly he told
Christopher to do. In addition, the debate in question did not take place within an ordinary conversation.
It took place in a court of law, where some participants had greater interpretive powers than others, where
several different notions of responsibility were at play, and where some participants had the power to
reject speakers’ accounts of their intentions. The rest of the paper is about illocutionary uptake in ordinary
conversation, so we cannot use the verdicts reached on the Bentley case and the criteria used to reach them as
a guide to making judgements about uptake in ordinary conversation. Nonetheless, I hope that this example
makes it easier to imagine how we might find ourselves unsure about the illocutionary force of an utterance,
and why such scenarios can be of moral and political importance. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer
for pushing me to clarify these issues.
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act the speaker intended to perform.3 According to this theory, if the hearer interprets
an utterance as if it is illocutionary act , then it is act , even if the speaker did not
intend to perform act . Call this the constitution theory of uptake. In this paper I
consider whether this newer constitution theory should replace the more established
ratification theory.
In Sect. 1 I discuss the necessity and the phenomenology of uptake, before contrast-
ing two ways of thinking about its power: the ratification theory and the constitution
theory. In Sect. 2 I offer three arguments for why, despite its intuitive pull, we should
reject the constitution theory. Firstly, it is incompatible with how we ordinarily think
and talk about speech. Secondly, it is incompatible with the thought that illocution-
ary acts involve the exercise of normative powers; the constitution theory entails that
illocutionary acts can be unintentional, yet one cannot exercise normative powers unin-
tentionally. Thirdly, it has unsavoury political implications, entailing that marginalised
people lack such a basic form of autonomy that they are barely agents at all. For these
reasons, the ratification theory of uptake has the upper hand over the constitution
theory.
1 The nature of uptake
1.1 The necessity of uptake
In ordinary language, ‘uptake’ usually means understanding, recognition, or accep-
tance. In his How To Do Things With Words (1976), J.L. Austin gave the word a more
technical meaning, using it to describe the role of a hearer in a successful illocutionary
act.
An illocutionary act is an act performed in speaking, which constitutively enacts
changes in the normative statuses of the speaker and the hearer. It is different from
a locutionary act, which is the act of uttering a sentence with a ‘certain sense and
reference’ (Austin 1976, p. 109), and fromaperlocutionary act,which is the production
of psychological effects on one’s hearer. If I utter the words ‘I promise to mark your
essay tomorrow’, I perform a locutionary act in so far as I utter a sentence containing a
meaningful proposition. I perform the perlocutionary act of making you feel reassured
that you will get your mark soon. And I perform the illocutionary act of promising; I
acquire an obligation to dowhat I promise to do, andmy hearer acquires an entitlement
to my doing what I promise to do.
Austin describes the role uptake plays in illocutionary acts as follows:
Unless a certain effect is achieved, the illocutionary act will not have been hap-
pily, successfully performed. This is not to say that the illocutionary act is the
achieving of a certain effect. I cannot be said to have warned an audience unless
it hears what I say and takes what I say in a certain sense. An effect must be
achieved on the audience if the illocutionary act is to be carried out. How should
we best put it here? And how can we limit it? Generally the effect amounts
3 Versions of this theory have been endorsed by Kukla (2014), Navarro-Reyes (2010, 2014), Sbisà (2001),
Langton (2018a, b), and Tanesini (2019).
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to bringing about the understanding of the meaning and of the force of the locu-
tion. So the performance of an illocutionary act involves the securing of uptake.
(1976, pp. 116–117).
Austin claims that uptake is necessary for a successful illocutionary act; for an
illocutionary act to occur, a speaker must perform a particular kind of utterance and a
hearer must respond to that utterance in a particular way. Not all speech act theorists
agree with this. For example, Kent Bach and Robert Harnish consider it sufficient for
illocutionary success that the speaker expresses the relevant communicative intention
(more on which shortly). This expressive act may elicit uptake, but that uptake is not
necessary for the act’s success (1979).
WilliamAlston purports to establish the non-necessity of uptake by using examples
like the following (2000). He argues that if I say, ‘Please could you bring me a towel’,
and you do not hear me, it still makes sense to say that I performed the illocutionary act
of asking you to bring me a towel (2000, p. 24). I agree that it would not be unnatural
to say, ‘I asked you to bring me a towel, but you didn’t hear me’, but such a sentence is
probably referring to a locutionary act, not an illocutionary act. The speaker is simply
reporting that she uttered a sentence in the imperative mood. Whether this act requires
uptake is a separate question from whether illocutionary acts require uptake.4
Others argue that uptake cannot be necessary for illocutionary success because this
would have unsavoury ethical consequences. For example, it entails that if a woman
tries to refuse sex, but her attempted refusal does not receive uptake (either because her
partner does not hear her or because he hears her but does not correctly interpret her),
then she has not refused.5 I agree that the necessity of uptake yields this result, but I
do not think this is a reason to reject it. That the woman does not refuse reflects the
sad reality that speakers from marginalised groups are often less able to communicate
successfully. Yet we should resist the temptation to conclude that, since she does not
refuse, her hearer’s subsequent actions are permissible. Lack of refusal is not the same
as consent. The woman has not consented and is therefore wronged when her partner
proceeds with sexual activity. Moreover, he should have recognised her utterance as
a refusal, and he wronged her by not doing so. We do not need to reject the necessity
of uptake to explain the wrongdoing in this scenario.
I will henceforth assume that uptake is necessary for illocutionary success. The
theories of uptake I will canvas therefore do not present a faithful picture of received
speech act theory, since many speech act theorists deny the necessity of uptake. Of
course, whether one believes uptake is necessary depends on how one understands
uptake; questions about uptake’s phenomenology and power and questions about its
necessity cannot be cleanly separated. I start with the assumption that hearers play
some kind of necessary role in the performance of illocutionary acts, and Iwill consider
different ways of theorising that role.6
4 Strawson argues that there are some essentially conventional speech acts, like marrying and christening,
which, unlike the speech acts of ordinary conversation, do not require uptake (1964, p. 456). I am concerned
only with ordinary speech acts, not with institutional acts like these.
5 See discussions in Bird (2002), Jacobson (1995, 2001), Mikkola (2011), and McGowan et al. (2011).
6 I assume that the hearer is also the addressee. Sometimes these come apart; one can overhear a speech act
addressed to someone else (see Goffman 1981). I also assume that when there are multiple hearers, they all
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1.2 The phenomenology of uptake
Here are two questions we could ask about uptake: ‘What is it like for the hearer?’
and ‘What role does it play in illocutionary acts?’ In this section I consider the first
question, which concerns uptake’s phenomenology. In Sect. 1.3 I consider the second
question, which concerns uptake’s power.
Austin’s definition of uptake as the hearer’s ‘understanding of the meaning and of
the force of the locution’ (1976, p. 117) is not particularly illuminating. It is not clear
what determines ‘force’, nor what makes it detectable to the hearer, nor exactly what
Austinmeans by ‘understanding’. Iwill now canvas two (not necessarily incompatible)
ways of understanding the phenomenology of uptake: as the hearer’s ‘recognition’ of
the communicative intention expressed by the speaker, and as the hearer’s ‘recognition’
of the conventionality of the speaker’s utterance.
Uptake is most typically understood as the hearer’s perception of or inference
about the speaker’s communicative intention.7 To perform an illocutionary act, one
must express a communicative intention to perform a particular illocutionary act. For
example, when Imake a promise, I express a communicative intention to promise. This
intention has three components: (a) I intend to perform a promise, (b) I intend that my
hearer recognise my intention to perform a promise, and (c) I intend to produce this
particular response in my hearer by way of her recognition of my intention to produce
such a response (i.e., I intend that my hearer’s recognition of my intention in (b) makes
her recognise my intention in (a)). Uptake, the thought goes, consists in my hearer’s
recognition of these intentions. Searle summarises this view as follows:
In the case of illocutionary acts we succeed in doing what we are trying to do by
getting our audience to recognize what we are trying to do. But the ‘effect’ on the
hearer is not a belief or a response, it consists simply in the hearer understanding
the utterance of the speaker. (1969, p. 47).
This view of uptake is widely endorsed, even by those who deny the necessity of
uptake. Those who endorse it include Kent Bach and Robert Harnish (1979), Stephen
Levinson (1983), Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson (1986), and Jennifer Hornsby
(1995).
There are at least two ways of thinking about the psychology of this intention
‘recognition’. It could be an event akin to the perception of high-level features in
Footnote 6 continued
interpret the speaker’s utterance in the same way. Heterogeneous uptake presents an interesting challenge
to all theories of uptake, but I lack the space to consider it here.
7 This account of uptake arose out of the combined efforts of Austin (1976), Peter Strawson (1964), Grice
(1991), and John Searle (1969). Strawson combined insights from Austin and Grice by arguing that uptake
(a notion from Austin) consists of the hearer’s recognition of the speaker’s expressed communicative
intention (a notion from Grice). Searle then modified Grice’s notion of communicative intention, and I
use this modified understanding in the paper. Grice thought that we express a communicative intention to
make a hearer come to believe a certain proposition. Searle noticed that intending to make a hearer have
a belief is a perlocutionary, not illocutionary, goal. A speaker’s illocutionary goal is to get her hearer to
understand or recognise what act she is trying to perform (Searle 1969, p. 47). Searle therefore proposed
that communicative intentions are reflexive intentions to perform a particular illocutionary act. Through
these collaborative efforts, we end up with the account of uptake as the hearer’s recognition of the speaker’s
communicative intention to perform a particular illocutionary act.
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visual experience; one instantly and automatically ‘perceives’ the speaker’s intention.
This might be facilitated by linguistic markers, like the use of performative verbs,
which trigger recognition in the hearer. Or it could involve the hearer inferring the
speaker’s intention (see Bach and Harnish 1979; Sperber and Wilson 1986). These
inferential processes are likely to be relatively automatic, and we might not always be
aware we are engaging in them. Both perception and inference leave some room for
error; sometimes we perceive things that are not there, and sometimes our inferential
processes fail us. I discuss cases of misinterpretation in Sect. 1.3.8
Alternatively (or additionally), uptake might consist in a hearer’s recognition of
the conventionality of a speaker’s utterance, i.e. its satisfaction of the conventions
attendant on a particular illocutionary act type.
Many speech act theorists believe that utterancesmust satisfy certain conventions, or
‘felicity conditions’, to constitute illocutionary acts. Austin, for example, thought that
for each illocutionary act there must be an ‘accepted conventional procedure having
a certain conventional effect’, which speakers must utilise (Austin 1976, pp. 14–15).
Speech act conventions typically place requirements not only on the words the speaker
utters, but also on the circumstances of the utterance and the characteristics of the
speaker and hearer. Some felicity conditions are necessary for illocutionary success,
such that if an attempted speech act does not satisfy them, it fails. Others are regulative,
such that if an attempted illocutionary act does not satisfy them, it does not fail, but
rather is defective or non-ideal (Austin 1976, pp. 15–17; Searle 1969, pp. 57–61).
Henceforth when I refer to speech act ‘conventions’, or ‘felicity conditions’, I have in
mind only the necessary rules governing illocutionary acts.
On a conventionalist understanding of uptake, uptake consists in the hearer ‘recog-
nising’ that an utterance satisfies a set of conditions governing a particular illocutionary
act. This might seem to involve circularity. If felicity conditions are necessary con-
ditions for illocutionary success, and uptake is necessary for illocutionary success,
then uptake is itself a felicity condition. And since uptake is the hearer’s recognition
that the utterance satisfies a set of felicity conditions, uptake must therefore recognise
itself.
We can overcome this problem by distinguishing between first order and second
order felicity conditions. First-order felicity conditions concern the utterance, the con-
text, the hearer (excluding her uptake), and the speaker. For an illocutionary act of type
 to succeed, it must satisfy the first-order felicity conditions governing acts of type.
The hearer’s provision of uptake could be a second-order felicity condition, consisting
of the hearer’s recognition that the utterance satisfies all (or most) first-order felicity
8 My account of intention recognition is simplified and idealised in several ways. For example, I assume
that we can always easily grasp the intentions speakers express. In reality, attributing intentions to speakers
is often difficult. Some hearers are more skilled than others at detecting intentions, and some speakers make
it easier than others to detect their intentions. Some, for example, deliberately express their intentions in
ambiguous ways (perhaps for politeness reasons). I have also assumed that intentions remain stable over
time; in reality, speakers can change their mind during speech, and sometimes interrupt their utterances to
modify the intentions expressed. It may be that speakers are not actually sure of the intention they have
expressed, and attribute them post hoc. Or, if we are tempted by interactionalist approaches to meaning (see




conditions. As with intention recognition, recognition of conventionality could be a
form of perception or an inferential process.
The intentionalist view of uptake and the conventionalist view of uptake are not nec-
essarily incompatible.Onmany accounts of illocutionary acts, the speaker’s expression
of a communicative intention is itself a felicity condition that must be satisfied for an
utterance to be a particular kind of illocutionary act (see, for example, Searle 1969,
p. 47). So uptake qua recognition of communicative intention is just recognition of
one particular conventional feature of the utterance.
That said, speaker intentiondoes seem tobe the feature of anutterance towhichhear-
ers are most attuned, as indicated by our comfortability with unconventional speech
acts, malapropisms, and ambiguous speech. Going forward I will assume that uptake
typically involves perceiving or inferring a speaker’s communicative intention, com-
bined with some awareness of the other felicity conditions the act satisfies (often we
might use the conventionality of an utterance as a guide to the speaker’s communicative
intention).
1.3 The power of uptake
In this section I will consider twoways of conceiving of the power of uptake, assuming
that uptake is necessary for illocutionary success. The two theories I present are not
the only theories available, so arguments against one are not necessarily arguments in
support of the other.9 Yet they are the twomost theoretically salient theories of uptake,
and I present them as a simplified polarity for ease of explanation.
According to the first theory of uptake, the hearer’s power is limited to either rat-
ifying the speaker’s attempted illocutionary act or failing to ratify it. The potential
illocutionary force of an utterance is predetermined by the speaker’s expression of a
communicative intention in accordance with conventions. She determines the illocu-
tionary act her utterance could be, and the hearer determineswhether that illocutionary
act succeeds. If the hearer recognises the speaker’s communicative intention, the act
succeeds. If she does not recognise it, the act fails and no illocutionary act is performed.
Call this the ratification theory of uptake.
I turn now to a second, newer theory of uptake, which I call the constitution theory
of uptake. According to this theory, the hearer’s response could make an utterance
constitute an illocutionary act the speaker did not intend to perform. The speaker
does not fully determine the potential illocutionary force of her utterance, and uptake
constitutes, i.e. constructs, the utterance’s force rather than merely ratifying it. The
hearer’s behaviour can determine not onlywhether an act is performed, but alsowhich
act is performed.
Quill R Kukla, writing as Rebecca Kukla, defends a version of this theory. They
claim that ‘there is probably no principled or sharp line between a speech act receiving
9 A third theory of uptake holds that hearers and speakers work together to decide upon the utterance’s
force, negotiating and co-constructing it in the course of the conversation. Robert Arundale defends such a
view, defining communication not as a matter of encoding and decoding intentions, but rather as ‘a complex
process of at least two participants interactively achieving separate yet conjoined operative interpretings
of a given utterance or behaviour’ (2008, p. 248). Such ‘interactionist’ theories offer an interesting middle
ground between the two theories of uptake under discussion, but I lack space to consider them here.
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mistaken uptake and a speech act being constituted, perhaps in unexpected ways, by
its uptake’ (2014, p. 443). They illustrate this using the following scenario.
[I]f I ask my dinner companion, “Do you think we should get married?,” this
speech act might constitute a marriage proposal, the start of a conversation about
the future, a request for an opinion, or a joke. Which it is depends partly upon
the social context and input: are we a functioning couple? Is this the right kind
of setting for a proposal? What was the rest of the conversation about? But it is
also partly dependent upon the uptake: if my companion laughs in my face, or
takes me unexpectedly seriously and gives me a definitive answer of a certain
sort then I might learn on the spot what sort of speech act I actually produced,
and the answer might surprise me. (2014, p. 443).
According to the uptake as ratification theory, if a speaker intends to propose, but
her hearer interprets her as making a joke, she fails to perform an illocutionary act.
Her utterance could only ever have been a proposal or a failed proposal. Yet according
to Kukla, the hearer’s interpretation determines which illocutionary act is performed.
Even if the speaker intends to propose, she could end up making a joke, if her hearer
interprets her as making a joke.
Kukla therefore denies that the speaker’s communicative intention determines the
force of her utterance. They claim that ‘intentions in speaking are part of the story
that gives a speech act the performative force it has, but they are not privileged or
definitive; the speaker may only discover, in how her utterance is taken up, what sort
of speech act it really was’ (2014, p. 444). Kukla also denies that the conventionality
of an utterance predetermines its force. Sometimes, even when an utterances satisfies
the relevant conventions for a particular act, other factors, like the speaker’s identity
and the context, can throw the process ‘off the rails’ (2014, p. 445).
For Kukla, speech acts have force ‘only in virtue of the concrete social difference
that they make, or how they are taken up in practice’ (2014, p. 443). This builds upon
the theory of language they developed with Mark Lance, according to which speech
acts are material performances ‘constitutive of changes in normative status among
various members of a discursive community’ (Kukla and Lance 2009, p. 12). Different
speech acts are individuated by their normative outputs.10 Orders, for example, change
the normative status of the person ordered in a unique way, such that she acquires a
particular kind of obligation to do something.
Though Kukla is clear about the power of uptake, they are less clear about the
phenomenology of uptake, claiming that it involves ‘others’ enacted recognition of
[a speech act’s] impact on social space’, though that recognition is not ‘a separable
moment of passive recognition’ (2014, p. 444). Perhaps they would allow that uptake
can involve deliberate misinterpretation. Perhaps a hearer could recognise a speaker’s
intention to perform act , but deliberately respond to the act as if it is act , thereby
making it act . In such a scenario, the hearer is consciously overruling the speaker,
and Grice’s co-operative principle clearly does not hold (1991, Ch.2).
10 Kukla rejects the perlocutionary/illocutionary distinction, which is why they speak of ‘speech acts’ and
not ‘illocutionary acts’. In Sect. 2.2 I show that we must maintain this distinction otherwise we fail to grasp
what is distinctive about speech vis-à-vis other actions.
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This paper is not about Kukla’s specific theory of uptake, but rather about the more
general idea (which Kukla endorses) that uptake constitutes the force of an utterance.
Going forward, I will assume that, regardless of whether uptake involves ratification
or constitution, it always involves hearers sincerely (but not necessarily accurately)
engaging with a speaker’s intentions by detection or deduction. I do not attribute this
view toKukla specifically. The key disagreement between the two theories, as I present
them, concerns whether a hearer’smistaken judgement about a speaker’s intention can
render the utterance a different illocutionary act from the one the speaker intended to
perform.11
An advantage of the constitution theory is that it enables us to isolate an unacknowl-
edged form of silencing, to which marginalised speakers seem particularly vulnerable.
Kukla illustrates this using the following example. Celia is a floor manager in a factory
and has the institutional authority to give workers orders. Yet when she attempts to do
so, her workers interpret her utterances as requests, because ‘they are deeply unaccus-
tomed to taking women as authorities in the male-dominated space of the workplace’
(2014, p. 446). The workers know that Celia has institutional authority over them, but
they do not interpret her remarks as exercises of that authority; her body marks her out
to them as someone who is ‘not an ordering authority in this context’ (ibid.). Orders
generate obligations, but requests leave the requested party free to grant or refuse them.
Kukla argues that regardless of Celia’s intention, because Celia’s workers respond to
her utterance as if it were a request, i.e. they take themselves to be free to refuse it,
her utterance was a request. An utterance which has the normative output of a request
is a request.
We already know thatmarginalised agents can be locutionarily silenced, i.e. blocked
from speaking at all; perlocutionarily silenced, i.e. prevented from producing certain
perlocutionary effects; and illocutionarily silenced, i.e. prevented from performing
illocutionary acts (see Langton 1993). The constitution theory entails that silencing
can go beyond this; speakers can also be silenced when they end up performing speech
acts which are different from the acts they intended to perform.
There are strong andweak versions of the constitution theory. On the strong version,
hearers can transform the speaker’s utterance into any illocutionary act. The speaker’s
utterance need not resemble, or satisfy any of the conventions for, the act they ulti-
mately perform. For example, imagine a speaker says, ‘Hello’, with the intention to
greet her hearer. If her hearer interprets the speaker as intending to perform a declara-
tion of war, the speaker could end up declaring war. Kukla can be read as endorsing
this strong version, as they claim that speakers often cannot ‘marshal standard conven-
tions in the standard way’ and a speech act can be performed ‘with an unconventional
output, given its input’ (2014, p. 445).
11 We could parse the difference between the two theories slightly differently.We could grant that for either
theory, uptake involves accurately identifying the speaker’s intention (i.e. it is always factive). However, we
could hold that for the uptake as ratification theory, uptake is necessary for an utterance to be an illocutionary
act,while for the uptake as constitution theory, it ismerely sufficient.On the latter theory, if a hearer interprets
the speaker differently from how she intended, there has been no ‘uptake’, technically speaking, but the
speaker’s interpretation could also be sufficient to make the utterance count as an illocutionary act (just not
the one the speaker intended).
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This strong version of the constitution theory looks like Humpty-Dumptyism in
reverse. While Humpty Dumpty declares that ‘When I use a word, it means just
what I choose it to mean’ (Caroll 1872, p. 124), the hearer on this strong version
might declare, ‘When you perform a speech act, it is just what I choose it to be’.12
This is not how we ordinarily understand communication, and it has worrying moral
implications, since speakers could end up unintentionally performing speech acts
which harm them profoundly. For example, attempted acts of sexual refusal could
become acts of consent.
Presumably the hearer’s interpretation, like the speaker’s intention, is constrained by
rationality and conventions. A rational speaker cannot intend to do what she believes
to be impossible; she acts roughly in conformity with linguistic conventions (see
Dummett 1986) and forms her intentions with the reasonable expectation that they
will be understood (see Davidson 1986). The equivalent should be true of hearers.
A rational hearer could not interpret an utterance as being a particular illocutionary
act if it did not appear to meet any of the felicity conditions for that act, nor if her
interpreting it as such would be inconsistent with what she knows about the speaker
and the context.
The weak version of the constitution theory could address these worries. This
version holds that the hearer’s interpretation is bound by rationality and conventions.
She can make it the case that a speaker performed an act she did not intend to perform,
but the act the speaker ultimately performs must be sufficiently similar to the act she
intended to perform. An attempted greeting cannot become a declaration of war, but
an attempted order could become a request.
RaeLangton suggests that unintentional illocutionary acts can occurwhen a speaker
attempts to perform an act with a ‘hearer-dependent’ felicity condition (2018a, p. 151,
fn.44).13 Orders are a good example of such an act. To successfully perform an order,
one’s hearer must judge one to have a sufficient level of practical authority. Hearer-
dependent felicity conditions like this can be satisfiable to different degrees, and
because of this a ‘hearer may weaken what would have been an order into a mere
request’ (ibid.).14
For this theory to work, there must exist classes of speech acts with the following
characteristics. They share all or most of their felicity conditions, and have a similar
normative force, which varies among the acts in strength rather than in kind. One of the
felicity conditions the acts have in common is a) hearer-dependent and b) satisfiable to
varying degrees.15 The extent towhich this felicity condition is satisfiedwill determine
12 One might counter that ‘Humpty-Dumptyism in reverse’ is in fact what Alice is defending in the first
place, given she argues that Humpty cannot help but refer to glory when saying ‘glory’, no matter what he
intends. However, Alice is not arguing that it is her own understanding of the word ‘glory’ which determines
what Humpty-Dumpty means, but rather the existence of linguistic conventions governing the meaning of
the word. Alice’s view, then, is neither Humpty-Dumptyism nor Humpty-Dumptyism in reverse, but rather
a conventionalist position in between the two.
13 Technically speaking, if uptake is necessary for illocutionary success, then all illocutionary acts have a
hearer-dependent felicity condition; the hearer’s provision of uptake. Yet I suggested in Sect. 1.2 that uptake
is a second-order felicity condition. Langton seems interested in the hearer-dependence of first-order felicity
conditions.
14 Alessandra Tanesini endorses a similar view (2019, p. 754).
15 For more on felicity conditions which can be satisfied by degrees, see Sbisà (2001).
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the strength of an utterance’s normative force and therefore which act among the class
is actually performed. Exercitives, for example, have similar felicity conditions and all
seem to generate a reason or obligation for the hearer to do something.16 But depending
on the practical authority ascribed to the speaker by the hearer, the obligation the
speaker generates by performing the exercitive may be stronger (as in the case of an
order) or weaker (as in the case of a request).17
Langton says little about the phenomenology of uptake, but I will assume again
that hearers consider themselves to be co-operative. In cases where a hearer renders
an attempted order a request, this occurs because the hearer sincerely believes the
speaker intended to request and not because she is deliberately overruling the speaker.
She will reason along the lines of ‘Surely the speaker cannot be ordering me, since
they lack the authority to do so—they must be making a request, and I will treat their
utterance as such’. And given requests and orders are sufficiently similar in pragmatic
structure, this reasoning can lead the hearer to constitute the speaker’s attempted order
as a request.
The weak version of the uptake as constitution theory requires more fleshing out,
but it strikes me as more plausible than the strong version. In accordance with our
intuitions, it grants the speaker at least some authority over what she does; she cannot
completely predetermine the nature of the speech act she performs, but she can at least
roughly determine its shape. Moreover, the idea that illocutionary force is a matter
of degree is already widely accepted in the linguistic literature on reinforcement and
mitigation (where what is increased or decreased is typically referred to as the act’s
‘strength’).18
That said, the uptake as constitution theory, even in this weak form, should not be
adopted. In the next section I offer three objections which apply to both the strong and
weak versions of the constitution theory.
2 Objections to uptake as constitution
2.1 Lack of correspondence
Before we can decide which theory of uptake to adopt, we must decide on criteria
to use when evaluating theories of speech. We must ask ourselves what speech act
theory is, and what we want it to be. I propose that our theories of speech should
be compatible with our everyday intuitions about speech, our moral intuitions about
16 Verdictive speech acts might form a similar class, in so far as they all involve offering some kind of
appraisal or verdict, and they all generate a reason for others to accept that verdict, but the strength of the
reason will vary depending on how much epistemic authority is attributed to the speaker.
17 Kukla presumably would not accept the existence of such speech act classes, since they argue elsewhere
that a request is not just aweak order, but rather has a distinctive pragmatic structure and generates distinctive
kinds of reasons (Lance and Kukla 2013). For them, requests and orders are not sufficiently similar such
that which one is performed could be determined solely by the degree of authority the hearer assigns to the
speaker.
18 See Holmes (1984); Bazzanella et al. (1990); and Thaler (2012).
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normative powers, and our political intuitions about autonomy. I will now show that
the uptake as constitution theory fails on all three counts.
Following Gilbert Ryle, we should understand one of the tasks of a philosopher
as analogous to the task of a cartographer. A cartographer mapping a village must
translate the locals’ knowledge of ‘every house, field, stream, road and pathway’ into
‘universal cartographical terms’ (1971, pp. 440–441).Hermap is compatiblewith local
knowledge, but presents it in impersonal terms and situates it in a broader context.
Similarly, the philosopher abstracts from and universalises our everyday concepts and
explains how they relate to other phenomena. Speech act theorists should produce
theories which reflect how we think and talk about speech in particular. They must
shed light on the nature of communication and its relation to other phenomena, without
undermining intuitions or mystifying everyday practices.
To see how the two theories of uptake fare against this ideal, we should ascertain
ordinary people’s intuitions about cases likeCelia themanager.Defenders of the uptake
as constitution theory might think this test is already in their favour. After all, Celia’s
employees are ordinary people, and they think she performed a request. The uptake as
constitution theory can therefore claim that it reflects ordinary intuitions better than
the uptake as ratification theory. Yet this is not the correct way to employ the test. The
workers are missing some important information; they do not know Celia’s intentions.
They likely believe she intended to make a request, when in reality she intended to
make an order. To ascertain their intuitions about the role of uptake in this scenario,
we must describe the whole scenario to them, including the speaker’s intention.
It is unlikely that, once informed that Celia intended to give an order and not make a
request, the workers would maintain that she made a request. Instead, they would give
a reason for why they misinterpreted her as making a request. A worker previously
unaware of his unconscious biases might confess that he was not used to women
giving him orders, so made an automatic and erroneous assumption about Celia’s
intentions. An openly sexist worker might confess to the following reasoning process:
‘Celia sounds like she is giving me an order, but as a woman she does not have a right
to boss me around and she must know that, so she must actually be trying to make
a request’. After receiving new information, neither worker is likely to maintain that
Celia performed a request. They would instead adjust their verdict and claim that Celia
tried to perform an order but failed, either because of misinterpretation or because she
attempted the impossible.
Even if my prediction is true—that the workers would revise their judgements when
informed of Celia’s intentions—one might object that we cannot extrapolate from
this to the claim that all hearers in all such scenarios would revise their judgements
when informed of speakers’ intentions. We might think that the prediction is likely
true in Celia’s case because the workers’ intuitions are skewed by their knowledge
of Celia’s authority over them. This knowledge may make the workers instinctively
more acquiescent and more likely to revise their judgements.
It is helpful to consider amodified scenario inwhichCelia attempts to order a friend,
not herworkers.19 ImagineCelia says to a friend, ‘Walkmydog’. The friend, reasoning
that Celia would not be so presumptuous as to order her around, interprets this as a
19 I am thankful to a reviewer for suggesting I compare these two versions of the Celia scenario.
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request not an order, and declines. When informed that Celia had actually attempted
to order her to walk the dog, the friend’s intuitions, unlike those of Celia’s workers,
will be unaffected by power differentials. Would she maintain that Celia performed a
request? If she respects Celia’s testimony and considers her a rational communicator, I
think she would revise her judgement and grant that Celia attempted but failed to order
(and indeed, she would likely feel indignant about Celia’s presumptuous behaviour).
Sometimes we do disagree with our peers about their intentions; wemight believe they
are deluded aboutwhat theywere trying to dowithwords. This ismore likely to happen
among friends; Celia’s friend, for example, might believe she knows Celia better than
Celia knows herself. But when we trust a speaker’s testimony about their intentions,
we do seem to regard those intentions as determinants of illocutionary force. This
seems to be part and parcel of what it means to partake in respectful, co-operative
conversation.
We often tell others that their speech had unintended perlocutionary effects. For
example, we might tell a speaker that she offended us, even if she did not intend to
do so. We also disagree with speakers about certain properties of their speech; for
example, we might tell a speaker that her comment was racist, even though she did
not intend it as such. And we also tell speakers that their attempted speech acts were
not successful, despite their intentions to perform the act successfully. For example,
Celia’s friend would probably tell her that despite her intentions, she failed to perform
an order. Yet if we are rational, and if we believe a speaker is rational (i.e. not a Humpty
Dumpty), we do normally treat her professed intentions as determining the potential
illocutionary force of her speech, even if she was not successful.
That ordinary people have intentionalist intuitions about illocutionary force does
not entail that the uptake as constitution theory is false. It is possible that our intuitions
aboutwhat determines force are at oddswith reality.However, ifwe are taking seriously
the thought that the task of speech act theorists is to map reality and take seriously
ordinary speakers’ intuitions, then we should prefer the theory of uptake that does not
entail that our intuitions about speech are wrong.
2.2 Normative incoherence
Another reason to reject the constitution theory of uptake is the fact that it entails a
conceptual impossibility: that we can perform unintentional illocutionary acts. I offer
below a simple argument for why illocutionary acts cannot be unintentional. I will
defend each premise in turn.
P1: To perform an illocutionary act is to exercise a normative power.
P2: To perform an unintentional illocutionary act is to unintentionally exercise a
normative power.
P3: Normative powers cannot be exercised unintentionally.
C: One cannot perform an unintentional illocutionary act.
2.2.1 Defending P1: To perform an illocutionary act is to exercise a normative power
To perform an illocutionary act is to constitutively (rather than causally) change the
normative situations of oneself and one’s hearer by creating entitlements and obliga-
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tions.When I perform a promise, for example, I create for myself an obligation to fulfil
that promise, and my hearer acquires an entitlement to my doing what I promised to
do. When I make an assertion, I commit myself to the truth of the proposition I assert.
Illocutionary acts, then, seem to involve the exercising of normative powers.20
We can create obligations and entitlements in a variety of ways. For example, if I
tread on your foot, I acquire an obligation to apologise. This does not mean that the
act of placing one’s foot upon another person’s foot involves any kind of normative
power. Rather, in treading on your foot I cause the non-normative circumstances to
change in a way that triggers a pre-existing general obligation—to apologise when
I hurt someone, perhaps. This act is very different from promising. When I make a
promise, I deliberately and robustly change the normative situation by communicating
my intention to do so.21 Promising involves exercising one’s normative powers by
constitutively changing the normative situation (Raz 1972). When I promise you I
will pay you back, it is precisely in performing the act of promising that I acquire
an obligation to pay you back. Acquiring that obligation is part of what it means to
promise someone. In contrast, acquiring an obligation to apologise is not part of what
it means to tread on someone’s foot.22
Even if they do notmention normative powers specifically,most speech act theorists
believe that illocutionary acts constitutively enact normative changes. This enactment
seems to require the exercising of normative powers. For example, Kukla and Lance
define speech acts as follows:
[W]e loosely follow Brandom in understanding speech acts as performances
constitutive of changes in normative status among various members of a dis-
cursive community. Thus, for instance, to assert that P involves undertaking a
commitment to P, taking up the role of one at whom challenges of P may be
directed, etc. (2009, p. 112).
20 Joseph Raz first introduced the idea of normative powers to moral and political philosophy (1972, 1977,
1979). Philosophers have since offered different accounts of why normative powers exist. Raz argues that
each normative power exists because it has a specific justification: ‘it is the nature of the reasons justifying
the norm [e.g., the obligation created by a promise] which determines whether acts affecting its existence or
application are power exercising acts’ (1972, p. 95). It matters little for my argument why or how normative
powers exist, but I do require readers to accept that they exist. Bootstrapping obligations into existence can
seem a bit spooky; Hume thought it to be ‘one of the most mysterious and incomprehensible operations that
can possibly be imagined’ (1978, p. 524). Yet it seems intuitively obvious that to make a promise is to bring
certain entitlements and obligations into being. If readers accept this, but deny the existence of normative
powers, it falls on them to explain the source of these obligations and entitlements.
21 I borrow the concepts of triggering and robust obligations from David Enoch (2011).
22 A reviewer points out that some cases seem to fall somewhere between the foot-treading example
and promising. Consider the act of ‘taking the Queen’s shilling’, a case discussed by Brandom (2000,
pp. 162–163). Historically when a British recruiting officer gave a man one shilling, that man thereby
became legally committed to military service. This was often done in taverns, so that the officers could take
advantage of drunk men who only realised the legal significance of what they had done the next day. Taking
the Queen’s shilling, it seems, constitutively changes the normative status of the agent; in this sense it is
less like treading on someone’s foot and more like promising. Yet unlike promising, and like treading on
someone’s foot, agents could perform this act unknowingly and accidentally, and so it is hard to see how it
could involve exercising a normative power. I think this case is complicated by the fact that it involves legal
conventions, which can institute normative statuses regardless of intent. As noted in fn.4, I wish to focus
only on the speech acts of ordinary conversation, and not institutional acts, though I acknowledge that the
boundaries between these can be blurry.
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Recall that to exercise a normative power is to constitutively alter a normative
situation; Kukla and Lance describe speech acts in similar terms. Similarly, Searle
claims that ‘just about every’ speech act involves taking on commitments:
Just about every speech act involves a commitment of some kind or other. The
famous examples are speech acts like promising, where the speaker is committed
to carrying out a future course of action, but asserting commits the speaker to
the truth of the proposition asserted, and orders commit the speaker to the belief
that the person to whom he or she gives the order is able to do it, to the desire that
he or she should do it, and to permitting the hearer to do it. In short, what people
have thought of as the distinctive element of promising, actually pervades just
about all speech acts. (2001, p. 147).
Key to these theories is the thought that when we perform an illocutionary act we
constitutively take on and assign to others normative statuses. The change in normative
statuses is not a downstream effect of the illocutionary act but rather constitutive of it.
There have been several analyses of particular illocutionary acts in terms of nor-
mative powers, especially promising (Raz 1977; Watson 2009; Shiffrin 2008) and
consenting (Shiffrin 2008; Dougherty 2015; Enoch 2017). Though assertion has not
been defined as an exercise of normative powers, specifically, it is frequently defined
in terms of the entitlements and obligations it constitutively creates (Brandom 1983,
2000; MacFarlane 2011), and thus could be appropriately modelled as an exercise of
normative power.
In fact, since all illocutionary acts seem to involve a speaker taking a normative
stance, and constitutively delimiting her entitlements and obligations, perhaps we
can conclude that all illocutionary acts involve the exercise of normative powers.
This seems to be the view taken by Richard Moran (2018), who observes a ‘close
relationship between the very idea of the illocutionary and that of the exercise of a
normative power’ (2018, p. 131).
Some might object that this is too quick. Maybe there are some illocutionary acts,
like promising and consenting, which involve exercising normative powers, and some
illocutionary acts which do not. For example, we might think that only illocutionary
acts with a world-to-word fit require a speaker to exercise normative powers, since
these involve a speaker attempting to change the world with her speech, rather than
simply describing it. I will show later that even if it is true that not all illocutionary acts
involve exercises of normative powers, this is not a fatal blow to the objection I put
forward in this section. Nonetheless, for the time being I will assume that to perform
any illocutionary act is to exercise a normative power.
One may wonder how the claim that illocutionary acts are exercises of normative
powers can be reconciled with the claim that to perform an illocutionary act is to
express a communicative intention using a convention. I propose that conventions
enable us to exercise our normative powers. To perform an illocutionary act is to
exercise a normative power by means of a convention. Exercises of normative powers
must be public; i.e. to constitutively change one’s own normative status and one’s
hearer’s normative status in speaking, it must be clear to the hearer exactly what one
is doing. Illocutionary act conventions, qua solutions to communicative co-ordination
problems (see Lewis 1969), facilitate this publicity and eliminate moral indeterminacy
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(seeDougherty 2016). They do not bring the normative powers into existence but rather
make possible their being exercised in a fine-grainedway.Wemight say that normative
powers are socially scaffolded by conventions.
2.2.2 Defending P2: to perform an unintentional illocutionary act is
to unintentionally exercise a normative power
P1 held that to perform an illocutionary act is to exercise normative powers. P2 largely
follows from this; it holds that an unintentional illocutionary act (if it were possible)
would involve an unintentional exercise of normative powers.
When I speak of an ‘unintentional illocutionary act’ I have in mind a speaker
performing an utterance with the intention that it constitute a particular illocutionary
act (like an order), where that utterance actually constitutes illocutionary act (like
a request). The illocutionary act the speaker in fact performs is not the act she intended
to perform.23
It is natural to assume that each illocutionary act involves either the exercising of a
different normative power or the exercising of a normative power in a unique way. If
I intend to perform act , but actually perform act , then either I have exercised a
different normative power from the power I intended to exercise, or I have exercised
my normative power in a different way from how I intended. I did intend to exercise
my normative powers in some way, and this intention was actualised, but I did not
intend to exercise them in this particular way.
Here is an analogy to support P2. Imagine I possess ‘musical powers’, in that I can
play the piano. I can exercise those powers in different ways (or exercise different
musical powers, depending on how one looks at it), in so far as I can play different
pieces. I sit down at the piano and attempt to perform Beethoven’s Piano Sonata No. 8
in C minor. If it were possible to perform unintentional ‘music acts’ in the same way
the constitution theory renders it possible to perform unintentional illocutionary acts,
then if, despite my intentions, my hearer interprets me as performing Bach’s Partita
no. 2 in C minor, they therefore make it the case that I performed Bach’s Partita no. 2
in C minor.24 If this happens, it is fair to say that despite my intention to exercise my
musical powers in one way, I actually exercised them in a different way; my particular
exercise of them was unintentional.
23 This ‘unintentional’ illocutionary act therefore involves some intentional action. I can conceive of at
least three other kinds of unintentional illocutionary acts, which I do not consider here. First, deliberately
open-ended illocutionary acts—a speaker intentionally performs an utterance, and intends that this utterance
constitute an illocutionary act, but lacks a specific intention as to which illocutionary act in particular it
will constitute. (This may be the best way to conceive of Kukla’s ‘Do you think we should get married?’
example, but it is definitely not the right way to conceive of Celia’s attempted order.) Second, inadvertent
illocutionary acts—a speaker performs an intentional action which was not intended to be an illocutionary
act, but it nonetheless receives some kind of uptake. For example, a person could intentionally perform
the act of singing to herself while not intending that this action be an illocutionary act, but nonetheless
be interpreted by a hearer as performing an illocutionary act. Third, non-intentional illocutionary acts—a
speaker unintentionally produces sounds (perhaps the vocal tics of Tourettes, or sleep-talk) and receives
uptake.
24 The two pieces are famously similar, so the example works for both strong and weak versions of the
uptake as constitution theory.
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2.2.3 Defending P3: normative powers cannot be exercised unintentionally
There is a common thread in accounts of normative powers. Gary Watson defines
normative powers as ‘powers to create or rescind practical requirements at will’ (2009,
p. 155). Ruth Chang defines a normative power as ‘the power to confer reason-giving
force on something through an act of will’ (2013a). For Seana Shiffrin, exercises
of normative power involve ‘the generation of morally significant relations merely
through the expression of the will to do so’ (2008, p. 500). For David Owens, in
exercising such a power, ‘I change what someone is obliged to do by intentionally
communicating the intention of hereby so doing’ (2012, p. 4), and for Victor Tadros,
‘Y has a normative power over X when Y can directly intentionally alter X’s rights
and duties’ (2016, p. 205). Though he is a little more tentative, Raz makes a similar
statement: ‘I am not contesting that many, perhaps all, exercises of normative powers
are binding only if they express the will of the power-holder’ (2019, p. 11).
The italics I have added to the above quotations point to the common thread; the
thought that exercises of normative powers are intentional. Though these philosophers
disagree about the precise contours of normative powers, they all agree that to exercise
one’s normative powers is to perform an intentional act, or an act of will. Exercises of
normative power are not merely typically intentional; they are necessarily intentional.
It is because an exercise of normative powers is an act of will that it enacts normative
changes in the first place; ‘your willing is the source of your reason’s normativity’
(Chang 2013a, p. 75).25
To see why this is so, we should reflect on why we need the notion of normative
powers. Our obligations and entitlements could come from many places. They could
be simply given to us, either by external normative facts and laws, if we are external-
ists, or by our passive non-cognitive states, if we are internalists.26 Yet this does not
fully capture the texture of our moral lives; sometimes we choose to create reasons,
obligations, and entitlements for ourselves, i.e. we choose to bring new normative
statuses into being. For example, by making a promise, I choose to create new obli-
gations for myself. My possession of normative powers explains why this is possible,
but only if exercises of normative powers are by definition intentional. If normative
powers could be exercised unintentionally, then the distinction between obligations
given to us and obligations created by us would collapse. The notion of normative
powers draws attention to the fact that we have power over normativity; if a normative
power can be exercised unintentionally, it is not a power at all, because the concept of
power contains within it the notion of control. For the notion of normative powers to
shed light on our moral lives, it must be that to exercise such powers is by definition
to perform an intentional act.
Having now defended P1, P2, and P3, I can show why the uptake as constitution
theory fails. I started with a claim that most of us can accept; that illocutionary acts
constitutively alter the normative situation of the speaker and hearer. I claimed that
the best way to make sense of this was to parse illocutionary acts as exercises of
25 One can accept that willing is a ground of normativity without also accepting that willing is the only
ground of normativity. For a defence of a ‘hybrid’ model of normativity, according to which willing grounds
some but not all of practical normativity, see Chang (2009, 2013a, b).
26 On the different potential sources of normativity, see Korsgaard (1996) and Chang (2009).
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normative powers (P1). Because illocutionary acts and exercises of normative powers
stand in this constitutive relationship, to intentionally perform an illocutionary act is
to intentionally exercise one’s normative powers, and to unintentionally perform an
illocutionary act would be to unintentionally exercise one’s normative powers (P2).
However, one cannot unintentionally exercise one’s normative powers, because exer-
cising one’s normative powers is, by definition, an act of will (P3). Therefore one
cannot perform unintentional illocutionary acts (C). The uptake as constitution the-
ory, because it entails that one can perform unintentional illocutionary acts, therefore
entails an impossibility and should be rejected.
Earlier I considered an objection to P1; perhaps not all illocutionary acts involve
the exercise of normative powers. If this is true, it is not actually a fatal blow to
the objection I have mounted against the constitution theory. We could quite easily
construct a modified argument, as follows:
P1*: There are some illocutionary acts such that to perform them is to exercise a
normative power. Call these ‘illocutionaryNP acts’.
P2*: To perform an unintentional illocutionaryNP act is to unintentionally exercise
a normative power.
P3: Normative powers cannot be exercised unintentionally.
C*: One cannot perform an unintentional illocutionaryNP act.
If the constitution theory entails that we could perform at least one kind of uninten-
tional illocutionaryNP act, then it still entails an impossibility, and we still have good
reason to reject it. The strong version of the theory would definitely entail this, since it
allows that a speaker could end up performing any kind of illocutionary act, regardless
of her intentions. Whether the weak version of the constitution theory entails this is
less clear and would depend on whether any illocutionaryNP acts form the speech act
classes I discussed in Sect. 1.3. I.e. it depends on whether there are any classes of
illocutionary acts which involve the exercise of normative powers and have hearer-
dependent felicity conditions which are satisfiable to different degrees. I suspect there
are, but I leave this puzzle for future work.
2.3 Political implications
There is one final reason to reject the uptake as constitution theory: it has unsavoury
political implications, entailing that marginalised speakers lack so much autonomy as
to barely constitute agents at all.
Being able to perform illocutionary acts by exercising our normative powers is part
of what it means to be autonomous (Hurd 1996, p. 124; Shiffrin 2008, p. 500). It is
helpful when thinking about autonomy and speech to distinguish between two kinds
of speaker autonomy, which I call positive speaker autonomy and negative speaker
autonomy.27 Positive speaker autonomy is the capacity to ensure that one is performing
the illocutionary act one intends to perform. Both the uptake as ratification theory and
the uptake as constitution theory entail that agents can lack positive speaker autonomy.
27 My concepts of negative and positive speaker autonomy are based on a distinction drawn by Alan
Wertheimer (2003) and built upon by TomDougherty (2018, p. 417; Forthcoming) in their work on consent.
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This is because both make speakers’ illocutionary success hostage to hearers, due to
the necessity of uptake. For example, if you attempt to perform a refusal, but your
hearer does not provide uptake, you do not refuse, and therefore you lack positive
speaker autonomy.
That both theories have this result is not cause for concern. It is obvious that many
agents are frequently prevented from performing acts they intend to perform. Indeed,
one of the main motivations for emancipatory movements like feminism and anti-
racism is to point out the ways in which certain groups lack positive autonomy, and to
develop strategies for increasing that autonomy. If we embraced a theory of speech or
action which entailed that everyone had full positive autonomy, we would struggle to
explain why emancipatory movements still exist.
Negative speaker autonomy, meanwhile, is the capacity to ensure that one is not
performing an illocutionary act one did not intend to perform. Performing actions unin-
tentionally does not always undermine our autonomy, but there is something unique
about illocutionary acts which makes unintentionally performing them autonomy-
undermining. Such acts involve constitutively creating obligations and entitlements
for oneself and altering one’s normative relationships. If another person can, on my
behalf, create rights and duties for me, ‘in my name’, which I did not intend to acquire,
then I am not a self-legislator. Instead, my own subjectivity is in effect remotely con-
trolled.
The uptake as ratification theory entails that we all have negative speaker autonomy,
since it precludes the possibility of unintentional illocutionary acts. The uptake as con-
stitution theory entails that we can lack negative speaker autonomy, and marginalised
people in particular are most likely to lack it. For advocates of the theory, like Kukla,
this is a selling point. One of Kukla’s goals is to show that marginalised speakers are
less autonomous than typically thought, and suffer a ‘special sort of incapacity’ (2014,
pp. 440–441). They take their theory to be explaining a recognisable phenomenon of
disempowerment.
And yet I propose that the constitution theory ends up harming the people whose
plight it is designed to highlight. Those at the bottom of the social hierarchy, according
to the constitution theory, will rarely succeed in performing their intended speech acts,
and will constantly perform speech acts they did not intend to perform, for example
consenting, refusing, and promising when they do not intend to. They are still bearers
of rights and duties, which they often accrue due to others’ misinterpretations, but
they are frequently unable to exercise or fulfil these, since any attempts to do so will
likely be misinterpreted and therefore reconstituted as acts other than the ones they
intended to perform. It is hard to see how such a person is really an agent in the first
place, since they have no recognisable autonomy. This is politically unpalatable. The
account may also have worrying implications for how we ought to treat such a person.
If it is an ontological fact that they lack autonomy, then we likely have less stringent
moral duties towards them than we do to more autonomous beings, and it may even
be appropriate to subject them to paternalistic control.
It is surely more palatable to say that marginalised people have the same degree
of negative speaker autonomy as anybody else, but they are wronged by (a) having
less positive speaker autonomy and (b) being frequently misinterpreted. The uptake as
ratification theory enables us to say this. It also makes it more reasonable for people
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like Celia to be frustrated about their situations. According to the ratification theory,
Celia’s workers have erred, and Celia could ‘correct’ them. She has the epistemic
upper hand. On the uptake as constitution theory, the hearers have not erred; they are
correct about what Celia did, and Celia is wrong. In this situation, it is hard to imagine
what recourse or redress could be available to her.
3 Conclusion
In this paper I put uptake, a notion frequently invoked by speech act theorists but
rarely examined, in the spotlight. I sketched different ways of understanding the phe-
nomenology of uptake, then considered two theories of uptake’s power: the uptake as
ratification theory and the uptake as constitution theory. The latter presents an intrigu-
ing challenge to the more popular ratification theory by drawing attention to the fact
that marginalised speakers are not only prevented from performing illocutionary acts,
but also taken to be performing acts they did not intend to perform. However, the
theory goes too far in affording the interpretations of hearers constructive power. The
theory is at odds with how we ordinarily think and talk about speech; it would require
the unintentional exercising of normative powers, which is a conceptual impossibility;
and it has unsavoury political implications, by renderingmarginalised speakers so pro-
foundly lacking in autonomy as to barely count as agents at all. For these reasons, the
uptake as constitution theory should not be taken up, and if we must choose between
the constitution theory and the ratification theory, the latter has the upper hand.
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